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INVITED DEBATE 
The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Cautionary Comments on the Rejection of 
Hypothesis Testing in Favor of a “Causal” Modeling Alternative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel H. Robinson Joel R. Levin 
University of Texas University of Arizona 
 
 
Rodgers (2010) recently applauded a revolution involving the increased use of statistical modeling 
techniques. It is argued that such use may have a downside, citing empirical evidence in educational 
psychology that modeling techniques are often applied in cross-sectional, correlational studies to produce 
unjustified causal conclusions and prescriptive statements. 
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Introduction 
Over the years, we have found that Joseph 
Rodgers (e.g., Rodgers, Cleveland, van den 
Oord, & Rowe, 2000; Rodgers & Nicewander, 
1988) has something academically interesting, 
meaty, and instructive to say. Against that 
backdrop, Rodgers’ most recent essay, 
provocatively titled “The epistemology of 
mathematical and statistical modeling: A quiet 
methodological revolution” (Rogers, 2010) 
merits close examination and extensive 
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commentary. Rodgers appeared to have missed 
the mark in two critical respects; both reflected 
in the subtitle “A quiet methodological 
revolution,” because as will become apparent in 
the following discussion, the revolution is 
neither quiet nor methodological. 
 
The Null Hypothesis Hullabaloo 
Rodgers is correct in stating that serious 
concerns about null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) have been mounting over the 
past several decades. Yet, as is well represented 
in Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger’s (1997) 
impressive volume, NHST criticisms have 
hardly been expressed quietly, but rather with 
full sound and fury. Moreover, in making his 
case, Rodgers provided a one-sided view of the 
controversy. Although several sources that indict 
NHST were cited, short shrift was given to 
approaches that have defended reasonable and 
proper applications of statistical hypothesis 
testing, including, among others, deciding 
whether a “believed-random” process is truly 
random (e.g., Abelson, 1997), “intelligent 
hypothesis testing” (Levin, 1998a), “equivalence 
testing” (e.g., Serlin & Lapsley, 1993), and 
hypothesis testing supplemented by effect-size 
estimation and/or confidence-interval 
construction (Steiger, 2004).  
In addition, numerous authors have 
defended the use of NHST when mindfully 
applied (e.g., Frick, 1996; Hagen, 1997; 
Robinson & Levin, 1997; Wainer & Robinson, 
2003). Rodgers cited social-sciences statistical 
sage Jacob Cohen (1994) as one who dismissed 
NHST practices in his 1994 seminal article, 
“The Earth is Round (p < .05).” Yet, in the same 
article, one could easily interpret Cohen’s (p. 
1001) comment about the “nonexistence of 
magical alternatives to NHST” as conceding that 
for whatever “good” NHST does, there are no 
adequate substitutes. 
Rodgers (p. 2) described the 
fundamental difference between the Fisherian 
and Neyman-Pearson approaches, with the latter 
“emphasiz[ing] the importance of the individual 
decision.” However, he characterized NHST as a 
hybrid and condemned it. Just because a 
technique is often misused is not a sufficient 
reason to abandon it. For example, it is argued 
below that in educational psychology we have 
observed frequent misapplication of the 
Rodgers’ favored causal modeling techniques. In 
recognizing that misapplication, however, our 
goal is not to deter researchers from adopting 
modeling techniques, but rather to encourage 
researchers to apply such techniques 
appropriately and to interpret wisely the results 
that they pump out. (Back in the Neanderthal 
age of computers, “grind out” would have been a 
much more fitting description.) 
As researchers who have spent most of 
our careers conducting randomized experiments, 
we have sought to apply NHST judiciously, 
typically adopting or adapting Neyman-Pearson 
a priori Type I, Type II error, effect-size, and 
sample-size specification principles. 
Accordingly, we have found that in experiments 
conducted with rationally (or better, optimally) 
determined sample sizes - that is, sample sizes 
associated with enough statistical power to 
detect nontrivial differences but with not too 
much power to detect trivial differences (see, for 
example, Levin, 1998b; and Walster & Cleary, 
1970) - NHST provides useful information 
concerning whether one has an experimental 
effect worth pursuing. In this context, pursuing 
means that obtaining a statistically significant 
effect is followed by a sufficient number of 
independent replications until the researcher has 
confidence that the initially observed effect is a 
statistically reliable one (see, for example, Levin 
& Robinson, 2003). 
In that sense as well, we have regarded 
NHST primarily as a screening device, similar in 
function to what Sir Ronald had in mind (e.g., 
Fisher, 1935). Much of the hullabaloo about 
NHST is caused by too many researchers 
focusing on the results of a single study rather 
than on a series of studies that are part of a 
program of research (Levin & Robinson, 2000). 
Fisher was never satisfied with an effect 
identified in a single study, even if it had a p 
value of less than 0.05! Instead, he believed that 
a treatment was only worth writing home about 
when it had consistently appeared in numerous 
experiments. As is implied in the following 
section, whatever purported advantages 
modeling techniques have over NHST also 
vanish unless researchers test a priori models in 
multiple experiments.  
Rodgers (p. 3) also condemned the 
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NHST jurisprudence model while aptly referring 
to Tukey’s (1977) “confirmatory data analysis” 
strategy as being judicial (or quasi-judicial) in 
nature. Yet, Rodgers mischaracterized Tukey’s 
exploratory data analysis strategy insofar as the 
detective nature of that hypothesis-generating 
approach clearly is not jurisprudence. It is this 
detective role that one emphasizes when using 
NHST simply as a research-based screening 
process to determine whether posited effects 
exist. To us, convincing a jury of one’s peers 
that a prescription for practice should be based 
on a single research study is rarely, if ever, 
justified. 
Rodgers’ (p. 9) assertion that a 
fundamental problem with NHST is one of 
testing valueless nil null hypotheses has been 
advanced by many critics. As researchers who 
endeavor to use intelligent forms of hypothesis 
testing with experimental data, we regard the 
problem of nil nulls not as a statistical issue but 
as a methodological one. Specifically, it makes 
little or no conceptual sense to apply NHST 
when comparing an instructional treatment with 
a “closet” (Levin, 1994, p. 233) control group 
(i.e., a condition in which participants sit in a 
dark room and do nothing), just as it is inane to 
compute p-values for reliability correlations 
(see, for example, Thompson, 1996). 
Educational psychology is filled with such 
examples of comparing new innovations with 
ridiculous straw-person control conditions that 
no sane researcher would ever consider using. A 
more appropriate formulation of a nil null is 
when an investigator wishes to compare a newly 
developed and previously untested experimental 
treatment with the best treatment that is 
currently available. 
According to Rodgers, “the [1999 task 
force assembled by the American Psychological 
Association] concluded that NHST was broken 
in [a] certain respect” (p. 3). Task-force member 
Wainer and the present first author (Wainer & 
Robinson, 2003) provided a different view of the 
task force’s brief consideration of the 
recommendation to issue an outright ban on 
NHST. As we have argued previously (e.g., 
Levin & Robinson, 1999) and in our preceding 
discussion, adopting such an extreme stance 
would be akin to calling for a ban on hammers 
because hammerers were hammering their 
fingers instead of nails (for additional 
discussion, see Levin & Robinson, 2003). Even 
the outspoken NHST critic Rozeboom (1997) 
acknowledged via another “tools” analogy that 
“the sharpest of scalpels can only create a mess 
if misdirected by the hand that drives it,” (p. 
335). Fortunately, in the case of the most recent 
(6th) edition of the APA Publication Manual 
(American Psychological Association, 2010), 
the hypothesis-testing baby was not thrown out 
with the bath water. 
 
“Causal” Modeling Techniques 
Contemporary modeling techniques, 
including structural equations modeling (SEM) 
and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), among 
others, which emerge from a 
theoretical/conceptual framework, are 
statistical/data-analytic and not methodological 
in nature. So, whence Rodgers’ 
“methodological” revolution? Even he noted on 
p. 8 that “SEM has been built into a powerful 
analytic method and is a prototype of the first 
approach [a model-comparison framework] to 
postrevolutionary modeling” (p. 8). 
That a statistical modeling tail often 
wags the methodological dog may have 
contributed to what we consider a major misuse 
of causal modeling: researchers attempting to 
squeeze causality out of observational or 
correlational data. Because of the unfortunate 
“causal” nomenclature, we fear that many 
researchers may be deluded into believing that 
the statistical control that such techniques 
provide for correlational (non-experimental) 
data is on a par with the genuine experimental 
control of randomized experiments (Levin & 
O’Donnell, 2000, p. 211). This in turn results in 
causal-model appliers issuing causal conclusions 
that they mistakenly believe are scientifically 
valid. As Cliff (1983) previously noted, “Literal 
acceptance of the results of fitting ‘causal’ 
models to correlational data can lead to 
conclusions that are of questionable value” (p. 
115). 
In addition, because causal-model 
researchers’ conclusions typically flow from 
revised data-driven models rather than from a 
priori theory-based model specifications, in the 
absence of independent validations those causal 
conclusions present even more cause for 
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concern. As with our previous hammers vs. 
hammerers distinction, Rodgers is well aware of 
researchers’ potential shoddy application of 
causal modeling techniques. Yet, he could have 
sent a stronger cautionary message to the 
relatively uninitiated model builder than his 
innocuous pronouncement that “the success of 
SEM depends on the extent to which it is applied 
in many research settings” (p. 8). 
To illustrate what we mean by 
prescriptive statements appearing in articles that 
include statistical modeling techniques, we offer 
very recent examples that appeared in a 
reputable educational psychology research 
journal. To avoid redundancy, we offer only two 
such unjustified causal excerpts here, from 
numerous ones that we have encountered in 
multiple teaching-and-learning research journals 
that we have recently read or reviewed (see 
Robinson, Levin, Thomas, Pituch, & Vaughn, 
2007, and the following section). 
 
Ciani, Middleton, Summers and Sheldon 
(2010)’s Study 
The following summary appeared in 
Ciani et al.’s study abstract: 
 
Multilevel modeling was used to test 
student perceptions of three contextual 
buffers: classroom community, teacher’s 
autonomy support, and a mastery 
classroom goal structure…Results 
provide practitioners with tools for 
counteracting potential negative 
implications of emphasizing 
performance in the classroom. (p. 88) 
 
There was one predictor variable; one outcome 
variable, a three-item scale that measured 
students’ motivation to learn; and three 
moderator variables, a three-item scale that 
measured student perceptions of classroom 
community, a four-item scale that measured 
student perceptions of instructor autonomy 
support, and a three-item scale that measured 
student perceptions of the extent to which their 
teacher emphasizes developing competence in 
the classroom. All measures were collected at a 
single point in time and HLM was used to 
analyze the data. Here are a couple causal 
conclusions from the discussion section: 
However, it appears that comparing 
students’ achievement publicly, or using 
the work of the highest achieving 
students as an example for everyone, 
may not be so pernicious a practice 
when students in the classroom perceive 
a sense of community among their 
fellow classmates. 
 
[O]ur findings demonstrate that if 
students feel respected by the teacher, 
such that their preferences and ways of 
doing things are acknowledged and 
accommodated as much as possible, 
then a strong performance orientation on 
the part of the teacher is not harmful. 
Autonomy support enables students to 
internalize what they are doing, so that 
they view their activity as important 
even if it is not enjoyable, or if it creates 
stress and pressure. Thus, it appears that 
emphasizing competition between 
students is not necessarily undermining 
of student mastery goals, if the teacher 
can communicate and promote the 
performance structure in a non-
controlling way. These findings are 
reassuring, showing that performance 
orientations are not necessarily 
corrosive – certainly an important 
message, given the performance 
necessities that all students face. (p. 95) 
 
As with most of these articles based on 
correlational data and yet that offer prescriptive 
recommendations, certain limitations of the 
research are explicitly acknowledged by the 
authors: 
 
The most significant limitation to the 
current study is that all data reported are 
correlational. 
 
Gathering data at one point in time also 
creates a limitation regarding the causal 
relationships among the variables in this 
study. (p. 96) 
 
These limitations aside (or ignored?), the authors 
proceeded to offer the following prescriptive: 
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Our findings, along with other goal 
theorists (e.g., Urdan & Midgley, 2003), 
suggest that given current prevailing 
attitudes and policy it may be more 
fruitful to emphasize adaptive 
instructional practices in the classroom, 
as opposed to trying to reduce 
maladaptive practices. (p. 97) 
 
Thus, the authors made recommendations for 
practice (“prescriptive statements”) in the 
absence of convincing evidence that such 
practices are clearly causally related to student 
outcomes. 
 
Chen, Wu, Kee, Lin & Shui’s  (2009) Study 
Chen et al. used SEM to analyze 
relations among fear of failure, achievement 
goals, and self-handicapping. Causal relations 
among the variables are implied in the 
Discussion section: 
 
This finding shows fear of failure as a 
distal determinant of self-handicapping 
and achievement goals (MAv and PAv) 
as proximal determinants of self-
handicapping, demonstrating the 
motivational process of self-
handicapping. (p. 302) 
 
The authors revealed the perceived magical 
quality of SEM allowing researchers to coax 
causality from correlational data:  
 
Since SEM analysis examines many 
variables’ relationships simultaneously, we 
rely on its results as the basis for our 
conclusions and discussion. (p. 303)  
 
The Limitations section is predictable: 
 
Although we used the SEM approach to 
estimate the proposed model, the data in 
the study are cross-sectional in nature 
and causal relations cannot be drawn. 
The longitudinal approach is preferred 
in order to ascertain the causal pattern 
and to further clarify the chronic effects 
of mastery-avoidance and performance-
approach goals on achievement-related 
outcomes. (p. 304) 
In contrast, what follows are the grand 
prescriptives that appeared in the Implications 
and Conclusions: 
 
We believe that the integrative model 
can help educators develop effective 
interventions to reduce students’ self-
handicapping, especially since we found 
that the mid-level achievement goals 
(MAv and PAv) mediate the 
relationships between fear of failure and 
self-handicapping… it is suggested that 
teachers use multiple indices to offer 
more opportunities for students to attain 
success. In addition, teachers should 
encourage students to embrace a 
multiple goals perspective in which 
doing one’s best and outperforming 
others are not in conflict with each 
other. (p. 304) 
 
Rodgers (2010, p. 8) previously proffered caveat 
aside, in both of the just-presented examples, 
cross-sectional (one time point), correlational 
(no variables were manipulated) data were 
tossed into a statistical modeling analysis and 
what popped out were causal conclusions. 
 
Correlational Data and Causal Conclusions 
Over the past few years, we have 
examined empirical articles published in widely 
read teaching- and-learning research journals 
and have found that: 
 
1. In one journal survey (Hsieh et al., 2005), 
the proportion of articles based on 
intervention and experimental (random 
assignment) methodology had decreased 
from 47% in 1983 to 23% in 2004.  
 
2. In another journal survey (Robinson et al., 
2007), the proportion of articles based on 
intervention methods had decreased from 
45% in 1994 to 33% in 2004. Meanwhile, 
the proportion of nonintervention articles 
that contained prescriptive statements 
increased from 34% in 1994 to 43% in 2004. 
The proportion of nonintervention (non-
experimental and correlational) articles that 
included prescriptive statements (in the form 
of causally implied implications for 
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educational practice) increased from 33% in 
1994 to 45% in 2004. 
 
3. In a follow-up to the just-described 
Robinson et al. (2007) survey (Shaw, Walls, 
Dacy, Levin & Robinson, 2010), although 
only 19 nonintervention studies in 1994 
included prescriptive statements, these 
statements were repeated in 30 subsequent 
articles that had cited the original 19. 
 
For the present article, we examined the 
first two issues of the 1999 volume of the APA-
published journal, the Journal of Educational 
Psychology, and again for the 2009 volume. We 
looked specifically at the comparative 
proportions of articles based on correlational 
methods and those that involved interventions 
(either randomized experimental or 
nonrandomized but researcher manipulated), as 
well as the proportion of correlational methods 
articles in which prescriptive statements were 
offered. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Although roughly half of the articles 
appearing in only one of the five journals that 
were part of Robinson et al.’s (2007) study were 
surveyed, the findings support the reported 
trends. Intervention studies (both randomized 
and nonrandomized) are becoming increasingly 
rare and instead researchers are basing their 
recommendations for practice on weaker 
evidence. Moreover, it appears that statistical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and nonrandomized) are becoming increasingly 
rare and instead researchers are nonrandomized) 
modeling techniques are becoming more popular  
- having increased from only 3% of the 
correlational research articles in 1999 to 40% in 
2009 - which may in turn contribute to the 
concomitant 10-year increase in prescriptive 
statements appearing in such articles. 
Thus, we have witnessed widespread 
application of SEM, HLM, and other 
sophisticated statistical procedures in 
correlational data contexts, where causality is 
sought but the critical conditions needed to 
attribute causality are missing (e.g., Marley & 
Levin, 2011; Robinson, 2010). Rodgers states 
that “researchers who are scientists…should be 
focusing on building a model…embedded within 
well-developed theory” (p. 4-5). Here we agree 
with former Institute for Educational Science 
Director Grover Whitehurst who argued that - at 
least in the field of education - we have enough 
theory development studies and need more 
studies that address practical “what works” 
questions.  
It is our fear that a research approach 
where the question, “Does the data fit my 
model?” is far more dangerous than the 
question, “Is there anything here worth 
pursuing?” As we have seen, an affirmative 
answer to the former question seems to entitle a 
researcher to form a model that indicates a 
causal relationship between, say, students’ self-
efficacy and their achievement. The researcher 
then develops a self-efficacy scale that measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Selected Results of Surveyed Articles Appearing in the Journal of Educational 
Psychology (1999 and 2009) Based on Either Correlational or Intervention Methods 
 
1999 2009 
Type of Study Type of Study 
Correlational Intervention Correlational Intervention 
Number of Articles 18 (60%) 12 (40%) 23 (66%) 12 (34%) 
Prescriptive Statements 9 (50%) ------a 13 (57%) ------a 
Statistical Modeling 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 14 (40%) 2 (6%) 
Prescriptive Statements 1 ------a 7 (50%) ------a 
Note: This table includes preliminary data from a larger study recently completed by Reinhart, Haring, 
Levin, Patall, and Robinson (2011). a Not assessed in the present survey 
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students’ self-perceptions and also measures 
achievement. The data may fit the model but in 
the absence of convincing longitudinal data, 
ruling out alternative explanations, and 
independent replications based on the previous 
nice-fitting model, this practice may lead to 
dangerous causal conclusions. For the just-
presented self-efficacy example, it is just as 
likely that high achievers feel better about their 
effectiveness as learners rather than the other 
way around. Apparently, many researchers 
believe that it is entirely appropriate to apply 
such modeling techniques and to interpret the 
results as support for prescriptive statements 
founded on causality. 
 
Conclusions About Revolutions 
To summarize, Rodgers (2010) has 
written a cogent essay on the vices of statistical 
hypothesis testing and the virtues of statistical 
modeling. We believe, however, that his essay 
painted a somewhat distorted (and potentially 
misleading) portrait about those statistical “arts.” 
In particular, we take issue with two aspects of 
Rodgers’ so-called “quiet methodological 
revolution.” For one aspect (rejecting statistical 
hypothesis testing), we argue that the picture is 
neither as bleak nor as open and shut as Rodgers  
portrayed. As supporting evidence, witness the 
sustained presence of hypothesis testing, along 
with its more intelligent additions and 
adaptations, in various academic-research 
disciplines - including the research-and-
publication “bible” of both our very own field of 
psychology and virtually all social-sciences 
domains, the most recent edition of the APA 
Publication Manual (American Psychological 
Association, 2010).  
For the other aspect of Rodgers’ essay 
that merits critical commentary (accepting 
modeling techniques), we argue that causal 
modeling and other related multivariate and 
multilevel data-analysis tools frequently cause 
their users to think - in accord with Rodgers’ 
seductive subtitle - that the procedures are 
methodological randomization-compensating 
panaceas rather than techniques that do the best 
they can to provide some degree of statistical 
control in a “multiply confounded variable” 
world. The unfortunate consequence of that 
methodological understanding, then, is that 
when combined with researcher misapplication 
of such modern modeling artillery, instead of 
being on target with their data analyses and 
research conclusions, weapons are backfiring 
and researchers are ending up (whether 
knowingly or not) with a considerable amount of 
egg on their faces. 
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